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Abstract - A scarcity of organs available for transplantation dictates a need new
sources. Two possible solutions to this problem are the use of organs from
anencephalic newborns and those from baboons. This is a comparison of the ethics of
these two sources, asking whether the sentient primate or the non-sentient human is
the more appropriate donor. It is sustained that the definition of personhood requires
the upper brain to be capable of functioning, resulting in an ability for self-
consciousness. There is an important difference, it is argued, between the human body
and the person within it. As such, the anencephalic infant should not have the same
rights as the sentient person. It follows that the life of the baboon, which is capable of
feeling pain and has some cognitive ability, is more deserving of protection than that
of the anencephalic neonate. In reaching this conclusion, a broad Utilitarian analysis
is applied, treating the suffering of an animal of some worth, but the 'suffering' of the
anencephalic newborn as irrelevant. It is acknowledged that on a Kantian analysis, the
baboon is not a rational creature, but reference is made to Kant's belief that animals
should nonetheless be treated with respect. It is found that Kant's theory would not
prohibit a well-regulated system of xenotransplantation, but that the weight which
Bentham attaches to an animal's suffering does provide insuperable difficulties. This
is further explored, with the conclusion that the causing of any suffering makes a
xenotransplantation program unjustifiable.
A. INTRODUCTION
Anencephaly is a condition which affects approximately one in every
thousand births,' resulting in a baby without a developed brain, with no
cognitive capacity. It is by no means an unheard-of affliction. Upon
finding out that a foetus is anencephalic, doctors consistently recommend
a termination of the pregnancy. Of those which are born at term,
approximately 28% are not born living.2 The prognosis for the remaining
babies is invariably death, with all but six out of a study of two hundred
T. W. Sadler, 'Embryology of Neural Tube Development' [2005] Am J Med Genet
Part C 2, 6.
2 Jaquier M, Klein A, Boltshauser E., 2006. 'Spontaneous pregnancy outcome after
prenatal diagnosis of anencephaly', [2006] BJOG 951, 951.
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and eleven dying within six days, and 67% dying within the day. 3 By the
point of natural death, certain organs are unsuitable for transplantation.
For the organs of the anencephalic newborn to be of any practical benefit,
they must be harvested from the foetus before it would have naturally
died.4  This is incompatible with the normal understanding of
allotransplantation in that it is required that the donor consents in some
form and is indeed dead. With xenotransplantation, though, the issues of
death and consent are legally overcome, as the law does not afford
animals the same degree of protection which it affords humans. The
question that will be addressed is whether it is ethically justifiable to use
the organ of a living, sentient and healthy baboon, to save the life of a
person, where there is the option of using the organ of an anencephalic
baby, who without permanent life support would die without the capacity
for any emotion or suffering. The answer to this question will rest on
whether the only relevant factor is sentience, or whether there is
something more significant in determining the relative statuses of a
human and another living creature. Throughout this exploration it will be
argued that the anencephalic infant is the more ethically suitable donor,
since the only appropriate factor is whether the donor will suffer or not,
however palatable this may seem.
It is agreed by all commentators that there is a scarcity of organs
available for transplantation. As the number of people on waiting lists for
operations continues to grow, more people are dying who could be saved
were an organ to become available.5 By 2003, almost a decade after the
launch of the NHS Organ Donation Register, it held the details of more
than ten million people who had consented to parts of their post mortem
bodies being used for allotransplantation. For the United Kingdom's
organ shortage to be sated, though, this number needed to be doubled, to
represent roughly one third of the population. 6 Furthermore, to compound
this problem, the donor system in the United Kingdom is not routinely
' ibid 951.
4 Alison Davis, 'The Status of Anencephalic Babies: Should Their Bodies be Used as
Donor Banks?' [1988] JME 150, 151.
5 Sheila McLean and Laura Williamson, Xenotransplantation, (Ashgate Publishing
Ltd 2005), 1.
6 Royal College of Surgeons of England, 'The Report of the Working Party to Review
Organ Transplantation', (Royal College of Surgeons, 1999) in McLean (ibid) 2, para.
135.
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consulted upon death by hospitals, so in the absence of any well-informed
friends or relatives, it is entirely possible that usable organs remain
unused, especially given the limited time frame within which doctors are
obliged to work. Indeed, these are problems which have been noted by
Parliament. Legislation such as the Human Tissue Act 2004 created the
ability for family members and even longstanding friends to give
permission for organs to be used in the absence of any evidence of the
deceased's consent. Furthermore, the British Medical Association has
advocated moving to a system of 'presumed consent' 8 , which would
require one to actively opt out of donation, again in conjunction with the
relevance of the views of close relatives in absence of such a decision.
This is an issue by no means unique to the United Kingdom and
moreover has been noted, with particular attention to the case of
anencephalic donors, by the Supreme Court of Florida where Rogan J
found 'an unquestioned need for transplantable infant organs' 9. Clearly,
any good source of organs for transplantation would be welcome.
The case of the anencephalic infant will first be explored, and
following this the focus will turn to xenotransplantation and with that a
comparison with the ethics of anencephalic allotransplantation. Initially,
the issues that the anencephalic presents shall be crystalised. Put simply,
the question that needs to be answered is firstly to what degree the
anencephalic infant is dead, and with that fit for being a donor, and
secondly whether it is sufficient ethically to define the baby as dead,
where its heart might still be beating, or whether there is more to
humanity than whether or not the brain is functioning, taking into account
the Kantian view of human life.
B. THE ANENCEPHALIC NEWBORN
According to the evidence that was put to the Supreme Court of Florida,
up to and including 1990, twelve successful allotransplantations had
taken place using anencephalic donors, but these had been 'most
successful when the anencephalic immediately was placed on life support
and its organs used as soon as possible without regard to the existence of
7 British Medical Association (BMA), Organ Donation in the 21st Century, (BMA,
2000) 2.
8BMA (n 7) 13.
9 Re TA.C.P. [1992] Supreme Court of Florida, November 12 1992, No. 79, 582, 16.
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brain-stem activity'. 1 Indeed, although the kidneys and other organs can
be successfully taken for transplantation after death, the heart needs to be
taken while it still beats. Furthermore, the body has the ability to react to
stimulus, even if it is unable to suffer." That is to say that there are
developed areas of the brain that are responsible for reflex reactions,
although there is no brain to interpret this as pain. The baby is not dead
within the definition of the English Common Law, since the anencephalic
newborn can have a partially functioning brainstem.12 This too is true of
the definition which has been reached by the Harvard Committee in
America. 13 Additionally, following a cardiopulmonary definition of
death, the baby is alive when it can sustain its own heartbeat and
breathing by way of the brain stem, which it is sometimes able to do for a
matter of hours or even days.
In English Law, the removal of an anencephalic's beating heart is
therefore prima facie a case of homicide. This too was the judgment
reached by the Supreme Court of Florida when they considered the
question in 1992.14 Indeed, this is what Alison Davis has argued in saying
'I may not be a doctor, but even I know it is not in anyone's best interests
to have their heart removed while they are still alive.'" 5 It is the use of
emotive language such as this which makes this question such a difficult
one to answer. But, it is equally difficult to think that somebody may be
suffering, in need of a heart, that could be supplied by an infant who is
otherwise destined to make no use of it and would be unaware were it
removed.
In Re TA. C.P, the Court found that the law defined death as a
cardiopulmonary failure, but allowed death also to be found where the
functions of the lungs and heart were being artificially maintained and
'irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the
brain stem' 6 had occurred. The condition of an anencephalic infant who
was able to sustain a heartbeat and breathing, despite the lack of presence
toibid 7.
Davis (n 4) 151.
12 R v Malcherek; R v Steel [1981] 2 All ER 422 (EWCA).
13 Francis L. Delmonico, 'Interview with Dr Joseph Murray', [2002] AJT 803, 805.
14 Re TA.C.P. (n 9) 18.
15 Davis (n 4) 152.
16 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1980, 'Uniform
Determination of Death Act, Section 1'.
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of the forebrain, was said to be incompatible with both of these
statements of death.' 7 What the Court failed to appreciate, though, was
that there is a significant difference between cortical brain function and
activity in the brain stem. The functioning of the brain stem in facilitating
cardiopulmonary activity is nothing more than a reflex action, and as such
represents the existence of nothing that makes a person different to any
other animal. The law quite rightfully affords different protection to
human life from that which is given to the life of animals. For example,
only causing 'unnecessary suffering'"8 of an animal is prohibited in
English Law, as opposed to the infinitely more serious crime of murder
against a person. It seems almost superfluous to point out that the vast
majority of people are content with the killing of animals for meat but
would find the concept of cannibalism abhorrent. And so, it seems to be a
non sequitur that an anencephalic newborn, who has the capacity for none
of the characteristics that make humans unique, is treated as any other
properly developed person. Indeed, Dr Levine, a professor of medical
ethics, has said that 'our brain stems do not differ substantially from the
brain stem of a fish'1 9 and as such an anencephalic infant 'has more in
common with a fish than a person'2 0 . The person does not exist in a mere
physical presence; if this were the case then a cadaver would be afforded
the same legal protection as a living and healthy person. Instead, the
person exists in the capacity for mental activity, which the anencephalic
never has. Irreversible cortical brain death, especially in the anencephalic
baby, should be seen as total death for the purposes of organ
transplantation, since it represents the death of the person, even if the
body is still active in limited and passive ways.
This leads on to a necessity of defining exactly what is meant by
human life. It has so far been argued that the anencephalic infant is not
'alive' in the sense that it is a living person, despite the fact that its body
is capable of responding to stimulus and can, albeit for a limited time,
sustain a heartbeat and breathing. It will now be explained why it is
sufficient that the anencephalic newborn is lacking all cognitive ability in
17 Re TA.C.P. (n 9) 18.
18 Animal Welfare Act 2006, s 4.
19 Sara Chartrand, 'Legal Definition of Death is Questioned in Florida Infant Case',
The New York Times (New York, 29 March 1992).
20 ibid.
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deciding whether or not it is dead. The most prominent work that has
been done to date on this subject is that of Green and Wikler. It is their
argument that there is a difference between the signs of life 'of human
bodies rather than those of persons'. 2 1 This is very similar to the argument
that has been advanced so far, that it is incongruous to protect an
anencephalic newborn in law in the same way that any other person is
protected, when they share none of the human's sentient characteristics.
Green and Wikler write that were the brain of A hypothetically to be
transplanted into the body of B, A would continue to live, whereas B
would not. It follows from this, they say, that where A's brain is
destroyed before transplantation, A no longer continues to live, which
leads to the conclusion that 'a brain-dead body has similarly been
stripped of the identity of the formerly associated person'. 22 It is the death
of this 'person', rather than the ceasing to function of the body with
which Green and Wikler are concerned. By this argument, it is shown that
the 'person' of an anencephalic newborn is never in existence. There is no
person. As such, the anencephalic infant, as a donor, is at this stage on an
ethical par with that animal donor, since neither qualifies for status as a
'person'. In neither case is a person being killed so that organs can be
harvested.
But perhaps there is more to 'personhood' than a strict question of
whether or not the upper brain is capable of sustaining cognitive capacity.
Stephen Holland cites the argument of 'personhood' 2 3, in determining the
ethical comparison of the anencephalic and animal donors. This argument
is that there is more to a person than mere sentience. Indeed, the science
of xenotransplantation has been developed because human life is prized
more highly than that of animals. It seems a logical conclusion, therefore,
that as the child of a human, the anencephalic is a less ethically sound
donor than any animal could be. But although the anencephalic infant
may share many physical human characteristics, it is unable to fulfill the
integral criteria that make a person distinct. A human, said Locke, is
defined in terms of self-consciousness.24 By this definition, the body
without an upper brain cannot be a person.
21 Green and Wikler, 'Brain Death and Personal Identity", [1980] PPA 105, 128.
22 ibid 126.
23 Stephen Holland, Bioethics, (Polity Press 2003) 32.
24 Linda Zagzebski, 'The Uniqueness of Persons', [2001] JRelig Ethics 401, 412.
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Furthermore, Kant believes that 'rational beings are called
persons'25 , and that it is this rationality which gives rise to moral
obligations. Indeed, with regards to non-rational creatures, Kant writes
that 'we can dispose of [them] as we please'2 6 . This is a category which
he has created to deal with animals other than humans, but the
anencephalic newborn fits into it too, however uncomfortable a fact this
may be. Kant's conception of morality in the second formulation of the
categorical imperative is that to be capable of being 'an end in itself2 , a
creature must be capable of 'rationality'. There is no debate that this is a
group into which the anencephalic infant cannot be shoehorned. To this
end, the baby is capable of being treated 'as a means to an end' 2 8 . Both
the arguments of Locke and Kant show that there is indeed more
deserving of protection than mere sentience, but that 'personhood' is still
founded in something which nonetheless requires the cortical functioning.
It is incorrect to treat a brain dead anencephalic infant, albeit with
functioning brain stem, in the same way as any other living person. There
is a material difference between the meanings of 'personhood' and
'human'. 'Personhood' can only come about through the functioning of
the upper brain.
Although perhaps philosophically sound, ethically many find that
this view is indefensible. One critic describes the concept that only the
rational are worthy of protection as an 'extreme anthropocentric'29
opinion that is rarely adopted. Indeed, it is difficult to sustain an argument
that only the rational creature has any worth, and to state that worth is
denoted solely in terms of morality. This is not necessarily at odds,
though, with the idea that the rational being is superior and should be
treated as a special case. There is a difference between establishing that
the anencephalic infant lacks 'personhood' and deciding that they are
worthy of no ethical concerns at all.
25 Immanuel Kant, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1785 (Mary J. Gre
gor tr., CUP, 1998) 4:428 79.
26 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, 1798, (Mary J. Gregor tr. Nijhoff, 1974) 127, 9.
27 Kant (n 25) 4:436, 85.
28 ibid 6:381, 513.
29 A. S. Daar, 'Ethics of Xenotransplantation: Animal Issues, Consent, and Likely
Transformation of Transplant Ethics' [1997] WORLD JSURG 975, 976.
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Kant's belief that rationality leads to a discrete form of worth, and
thus that rational beings should treat other rational beings as a 'means to
an end' 30 is useful for creating a hierarchy of importance, but it is best
understood merely as demonstrating that a person has 'absolute and
unconditional value'3 1 . It need not be used to demonstrate that any
creature lacking rationality has no value. By following Kant's argument,
one is not restricted to concluding that any non-rational creature is
equally unworthy of respect. Indeed, Wood writes that Kant does not
believe that animals can be treated solely as tools, but instead are worthy
of 'gratitude and affection' 32 . It is clear, therefore, that Kant's second
formulation of the categorial imperative is not contradictory to a
conclusion that the anencephalic newborn is a more ethically appropriate
donor than the sentient animal. Instead, this is surely in-keeping with
Kant's philosophy. For example, Kant is strongly against 'agonizing
physical experiments [on animals] for the sake of mere speculation, or
whose end can be achieved in other ways' 3 . This indubitably shows that
suffering should not be needlessly inflicted upon non-rational living
creatures. The non-sentient infant, lacking in 'personhood', is therefore
better than the animal for choosing as a donor. It has now been shown
that the anencephalic newborn should be correctly regarded as dead,
despite any heartbeat, for the purposes of organ donation. Furthermore,
falling outside of the category of the 'rational person', it is clear that the
infant need not be treated with the same degree of protection that is
appropriate for persons, but can instead be ethically used to benefit other
humans. Finally, the anencephalic baby has been shown to be worthy of
less protection than animals, due to its inability to suffer.
C. EXTENDING THIS PRINCIPLE
The anencephalic newborn has been shown to lack 'personhood' and be
suitable for organ donation. It will now be asked whether the infant can
ethically be indefinitely kept on artificial life support, allowing it to grow
30 Kant (n 25) 6:381, 513.
31 Allen Wood and Onora O'Neill, 'Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature',
[1998] Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 189,189.
32 ibid 191.
33 Kant (n 25) 6:443, 564.
51
Manners Maketh Man
so as to cultivate organs suitable for allotransplantation34 into larger and
older patients. The discussion begins with the problem of consent. It is
lawful for medical treatment to be given to a patient who is unable to
consent where it is in their best interests. For this reason, ventilation and
life support for an anencephalic newborn could be justified within law
because in line with current medical practice they are not dead, within the
cardiopulmonary and whole-brain definitions. 3 5 It can then be argued that
to artificially keep somebody alive solely for the purpose of preserving
the state of their organs so that they can be donated at a later time is in
fact a tort and could even give rise to criminal liability. 36 Even with the
case of an unconscious child under 16, where the parents can give
consent, this is limited to cases where it is in the patient's best interests. 37
These are the usual objections to life support solely to aid a later
transplantation, but where the patient is not a person, the issue of consent
surely cannot be of relevance. Returning to the words of Alison Davis, 'it
is not in anyone's best interests to have their heart removed' 3 8 either, but
without the upper brain and with that cortical function, the anencephalic
infant is not an 'anyone'. Kant's reasoning too, with regards to respect for
animals, cannot be in point here because it centers on an obligation to not
cause unnecessary suffering. With the brainless infant there can be no
such suffering. Indeed, it may not be normal practice to artificially
prolong the life of an anencephalic newborn for organ donation purposes,
but parents who decide to give birth to an anencephalic foetus often do so
for the purpose of allowing their organs to be used. This was the
reasoning of the parents of Theresa Ann Campo Pearson, with whom the
Re T.A.C.P. case was concerned, who discovered the condition in
34 Allotransplantation' is a hybrid of Classical Greek and Latin, derived from the
Classical Greek 'akkoc', meaning 'other' and the Latin 'trans' and 'plantare' meaning
'across' and 'to plant' respectively. It is used to refer to the moving of an organ
between two bodies of the same species which are genetically different, contrasted
with xenotransplantation and autotransplantation, where the donor is the same as the
recipient. Because of this definition, there is no conflict between the use of the term
with regards to the anencephalic infant and the fact that the infant does not satisfy the
criteria to be a 'person'; the term 'allotransplantation' refers to the genetics of the
body and not the status of the individual.
35 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1 (UKHL).
36 Robert Francis, 'An Ethical Debate: A legal comment', [1995] BMJ 718, 719.
37 Kennedy and Grubb (eds), Medical Law, (3rd edn, Butterworths 2000), 824.
38 Davis (n 4) 152.
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prenatal tests but decided to 'donate their daughter's organs for
transplant'3 9 . Some parents feel so strongly about this desire that they are
willing to explore different hospitals to find one which is willing to
transplant the organs, where they have been 'poo poo'd'4 0 by others. In
this case, as with the case of artificial life support, the life is being
prolonged not for any benefit to the foetus or neonate, but as a means to
an end. The only material difference, though, is that one is an artificial
action where the other is an omission. In terms of utilitarianism, a body of
philosophy which to this point has been neglected, both concepts are
similar.
Utilitarianism is concerned with creating the greatest utility, or
happiness, for the greatest number of people. Applying this principle
strictly, one should not only answer any problem with the solution that
provides the greatest net utility, but is morally obliged to perform any
action which would cause an increase. That is to say that if it were to be
realised that the termination of an anencephalic foetus would increase
utility, that would be an obligation. Omissions should be treated no
differently to actions. Without any cortical functions, an anencephalic
neonate does not feature in a utilitarian equation. But, in finding this
balance, utilitarianism demands that all effects are taken into account.
This would of course include not only any potential patients who could be
helped, but also any relatives who may be positively or detrimentally
affected by the use of the infant's body. It seems inappropriate to be
concerned with third parties when assessing techniques which have the
capacity to save and end lives, but in a utilitarian philosophy an
emotional harm caused can be measured against the benefit of life-saving
treatment, however negligibly.
One anencephalic newborn has the potential to save two lives, by
way of the heart and the liver, whilst also greatly benefitting a number of
others by way of kidneys and corneas, and other transplantable tissues.41
Davis recognises that the infant is not to be taken into account for the
purposes of utility, but goes on to suggest that this concept 'would justify
39 Chartrand (n 19).
40 ibid.
41 James Walters and Stephen Ashwal, 'Organ Prolongation in Anencephalic Infants:
Ethical & Medical Issues, in The Hastings Center Report (1988) Vol. 18, 19.
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using any of us as a donor if someone of the status of Einstein' 42 needed a
transplant. Indeed, Einstein may be able to create more utility by using a
heart than many other people, but where Davis' argument seems to falter
is that she fails to take into account those who might be affected by the
abuse of a person who may otherwise live. Furthermore, it would surely
be greatly unsettling to live in a society where one knew that their organs
might at any time forcibly be used to save another person. Although this
is a most inexact science, it is easy to conclude that this ubiquitous unease
would outweigh any benefits of this 'Robin Hood' style reallocation
system.
A similar mistake is made by Ethics and Social Impact Committee
of the Transplant Policy Centre in their statement that 'no conflict of
rights' 43 occurs in a utilitarian analysis of anencephalic donation. A
Kantian conception of the status of the person may be unable to take into
account the effect on third parties such as relatives, but this is something
to which utilitarianism is sensitive, looking at society as a whole.
Returning to the original issue, although there may be little difference in
principle between failing to terminate a pregnancy, and artificially
sustaining the infant after birth, potentially for a number of years, there is
surely a difference in the effect which this has on others. Relatives,
particularly parents, may feel glad that the newborn is delivered, and that
it is given a fair chance, and may further feel glad that it has saved the
lives of other babies, but in most cases it seems fair to assume that this
pleasure would be overtaken by prolonged upset and a lack of 'closure' if
the baby were to kept alive until adult sized, diminishing the net utility.
Moreover, remaining in the factual, rather than philosophical, arena, the
number of anencephalics which survive birth and are viable is very low.
There is no need to cultivate these babies for any significant time to allow
older patients to be helped, since there are sufficient younger hosts for
transplantation, with more than 400 young hearts being required each
year in American alone.4 4 When factors such as public discomfort at
babies being artificially grown being taken into consideration, and the
42 Davis (n 4) 150.
43 The Ethics and Social Impact Committee, 'Anencephalic Infants as Sources of
Transplantable Organs', in The Hastings Center Report, (1988) Vol. 18, 28, 29.
44 Peter McCullagh, Brain Dead, Brain Absent, Brain Donors, (Wiley and Sons,
Chichester, 1993), 143.
54
UCL Journal ofLaw and Jurisprudence
fact that the lives of younger patients may have to be sacrificed in order
to save older patients, the utilitarian justification fails. It therefore cannot
be justified philosophically to artificially maintain an anencephalic
infant's life for a significant time, merely to cultivate larger organs. There
is justification, though, to keep the neonate on life support for sufficient
time to successfully perform a transplantation, partly to avoid any
feelings of futility on the part of third parties, but primarily to save lives.
It would be a question of fine utilitarian judgment as to whether this
could be done against the will of a parent.
This concludes the initial discussion of the ethics of the
anencephalic organ donation. It has been shown thus far that an
anencephalic neonate should be treated as never having been alive for
medical and legal purposes, although the laws of England and of America
adopt definitions which conflict with this. The neonate may be 'human'
but is not a 'person', and as such should be subject to none of the
protection afforded to people in law. Adopting a Kantian view of
personhood, the infant is outside of the class of rational beings along with
all other animals, but it is not true that each member of this class is
therefore necessarily the same. The same Kantian thought allows for a
hierarchy, which is defined primarily in terms of an ability to suffer. In
this hierarchy, the anencephalic infant necessarily comes lower down
than sentient creatures such as the baboon, for this reason seemingly
providing a more ethically sound organ source. This argument though, on
a utilitarian basis, does not extend to allowing the artificial sustaining of
anencephalic life until such time as the organs can be used for
transplantation into physically mature hosts.
D. THE BABOON
Just like the anencephalic infant, the baboon is incapable of rational
thought, but does not lack every characteristic which separates the homo
sapiens from more base forms of natural life. The problems with
xenotransplantation are as much practical as they are ethical and
philosophical. Although the chimpanzee may prove to be a scientifically
viable source of organs, it is considered an endangered species, and so it
is difficult to justify further depleting their numbers.45 This could perhaps
45 Daar (n 29) 976.
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be overcome in time by specific rearing of these animals in captivity. The
baboon, on the other hand, although more common, breeds slowly and it
would therefore take great amounts of time and money to produce a
usable number in captivity.46 Other problems include the inherent
technical difficulties in cross-species medicine, and the potential for
unexpected and uncorrectable xenozoonosis,47 similar to the current
struggle against HIV in much of the world, which is thought to have
48
originated in monkeys. In short, xenotransplantation is an immature area
of science.
The ethical issues are greatly similar to some of the concerns
regarding the anencephalic case. The issue of sentience is again
significant. This has partly been dealt with by way of the Kantian
argument of non-rationality. One argument which did not arise with
regards to the anencephalic was the degree of suffering which can
legitimately be caused. This will be discussed with regards to Benthamite
philosophy. It will be examined whether there are material differences
between different species of animal. A final question that will be posed is
whether, given that the anencephalic infant is a more ethical donor than
the baboon, whether the baby could be used to perform a
xenotransplantation upon the baboon, were science to permit this.
Xenotransplantation is an attractive option, partly because it neatly
sidesteps any of the murky issues such as consent which necessarily
legally surround the use of human organs. Furthermore, it would avoid
the issues presented when an organ is available, but a patient is not, or
perhaps when an organ is needed but a suitable human cadaver cannot be
found in time.4 9 We are currently comfortable throughout the world in
breeding animals for the purpose of food production, and indeed pigs are
widely used to provide certain tissues such as heart valves. Furthermore,
we have the understanding and indeed the technology to keep suffering to
a minimum. 0 In this respect, xenotransplantation is a practical option.
46 ibid.
47 Cross-species disease.
48 Daar (n 29) 977.
49 Holland (n 23) 30.
50 James Giordano and Bert Gordijn (eds), Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives
in Neuroethics (CUP, 2010) 193.
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It is unnecessary and inappropriate to discuss other practical issues
in great depth, such as the possibility of the xenozoonosis and the large
price of producing suitable donor animals. Indeed, it should be noted that
scientific ability is less developed with regards to xenotransplantation
than it is with regards to the donation of organs from anencephalic
infants, although not even this has yet been perfected. This, as well as
other practical concerns, are significant to the extent that any ethical
argument in favour of using the baboon is lessened by the recognition that
in real terms it is potentially less suitable.
One possible connotation of xenozoonosis, though, is its
ramifications in terms of consent. Until this point, little consideration has
been given to the patients who receive all of these hypothetical organs. It
has been tacitly assumed that they would be glad to receive any organ
which they could, since the other option would be sickness and death.
But, an issue which is exclusive to the case of the baboon is that the
transplantee must act differently after the operation and possibly for the
rest of their lives. While the science is young, Daar believes that a
xenotransplant will lead the recipient to agree to lose all privacy and
confidentiality in the course of consenting to the operation, so as to
facilitate frequent monitoring.5 With the risks of new diseases similar to
HIV being unknown, the host will have to be quarantined from leading a
normal life for a significant period. Such restrictions could not be
optional, and once the operation was complete, it would need to be
impossible to opt out, for both personal health concerns and the
protection of the public at large. Daar is correct to conclude that we
would 'need to forego "consent" for a legally binding "contract"52 . This is
a truly pertinent observation, but it should be developed to add that this is
only the case because of the stage of medical knowledge, given the rarity
with which such operations have been conducted in the past. If and when
xenotransplantation becomes better understood and safer, this argument
will become irrelevant, following the creation of data bases from early
successful recipients53 . Indeed, it may be a concern for now, but as it is
s1 Daar (n 29) 977.
52 ibid.
53 Marian Michaels, 'Infectious Concerns of Cross-Species Transplantation:
Xenozoonoses', [1997] WORLD JSURG 968, 972.
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only a temporary problem, as with the development of any new medicine,
it should not be given too much weight.
It is the belief of Kant that suffering of animals should be limited
and that they should be treated with respect, even if they are not rational.
Immediately, this creates concerns with xenotransplantation in that it is a
pre-requisite that the donor animals are raised in special closed conditions
so as to ensure they are 'specified-pathogen free' 54 . If allowed to live in
conditions as similar to their natural habitat as possible, Kant's concerns
can be overcome, where suffering is not needlessly inflicted. But the
concerns of Bentham are more extensive and perhaps more problematic.
Jeremy Bentham is frequently quoted as writing 'The question is not Can
they reason? no Can they talk: but Can they suffer?' 55 In this maxim,
Bentham directly contests the work of Kant. The concern is raised that if
reason is the sole criterion, then a mature horse is 'a more rational, as
well as a more conversable animal' 56 than any new born human. This
criticism can be overcome, though, by taking an ever so slightly nuanced
Kantian view, that is cognitive potential not ability. Upon this meaning,
which would even be strengthened by the importance that potential plays
in Bentham's own utilitarian philosophy, the anencephalic newborn
would remain outside the Kantian category, as would animals. But there
is something to be said, still, for Bentham's views. Although an animal
may be outside the Kantian category of personhood, Kant and Bentham
agree that their suffering is regrettable. Kant believes that it must be
justified.
Indeed, the baboon does have the capacity to suffer. It is one of the
animals most closely related to the human. It is paradoxical almost that
because they are so closely related to us, and perhaps therefore deserving
of many rights which accrue to humans, argues Daar, they are thought to
be one of the most suitable matches for xenotransplantation. 57 A question
to address, though, is whether it is sufficient to say that the baboon
suffers, or whether it must be stated to what extent the baboon can suffer.
54 Daar (n 29) 976.
B. E. March, 'Ethical Problems: Animal Welfare, Animal Rights', [1984]
BIOSCIENCE 615, 617.
56 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789
(J.H. Bums and H. L. A. Hart eds. Clarendon Press 1996) footnote 283.
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Singer is of the opinion that such a discussion is of little
consequence, since the 'principle of equal consideration' 5 8 requires that
all like interests between species are equally treated. He writes that 'pains
of the same intensity and duration are equally bad, whether felt by
humans or animals'59 . But surely cognitive capacity should in some way
effect the weight which is given to the potential suffering of pain. It
seems inappropriate to compare the complex emotions that might be
suffered by a person in accompaniment to a painful stimulus, such as fear
of repeat incidents, upset at the reasons behind the cause of the pain and
even the possibility of blaming oneself for getting into such difficulty, to
the more base interpretation of suffering as merely suffering which an
animal might experience. Both the human and the animal may feel pain in
the same way, but the accompanying feelings will surely be greatly more
distressing for the human. But, although this difference can be found
between the person and the non-human, studies have shown that 'the
linguistic capacities of even the higher primates must not be
exaggerated' 6 0 . That is to say that even though animals such as baboons
are capable of learning certain tasks and exhibiting human like behaviour,
in reality their cognitive ability is not as great as it may seem. In this
respect, a division can be found between different animals, particularly
between humans and non-humans, but other differences must not be
overstated. The variance of suffering between the pig and the baboon may
not in fact be that great.
Furthermore, it has been argued that it is justifiable for humans to
attach more weight to human suffering than to that of animals 'because
human beings have certain relations to other human beings which they do
not have to animals.' 6 1 That is to say that by dint of such factors as
economic and familial relationships, and communication between one
another, Francis and Norman argue that it is understandable that humans
treat each other with more respect than they treat animals, and value their
58 Adam Kolber, 'Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and
Other Apes', [2001] STANJL 163, 187.
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60 Leslie Pickering Francis and Richard Norman, 'Some Animals are More Equal than
Others', [1978] PHILOSOPHY 507, 513.
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interests more highly. This argument is again almost Kantian, in that is
prizes the fruits of rationality and cognitive ability above more
rudimentary and instinctive relationships, but it says nothing about
physical suffering. It therefore seems that Singer's argument of equal
consideration may have its merits when comparing between different
animals, but that it should not apply to humans whose rationality and
cognitive function clearly and justifiably sets them apart with regards to
suffering. To create a hierarchy of different sentient animals, though, is
perhaps irrelevant.
To this extent, it is not ethically perfect to bring animals up in
captivity so as to create a stock of organs, but it seems to be no better to
rear a pig than a baboon. In either case, there is a need for specialised
facilities with animals being birthed by caesarian section and 'under
current standard practices, the sow is not recovered from the procedure
62
and the piglets are hand-raised under sterile conditions' 6 , remaining
forever separated from other animals. There is nothing natural about this.
Furthermore, genetic engineering, which has already been endorsed by a
United Kingdom Government advisory committee, has the potential to
increase animal susceptibility to illness and inflict far greater suffering. 63
We may be happy to raise animals specifically to produce meat, and kill
them for this purpose, but there are material differences between that
process and this. It does not follow that one can be used to justify the
other. The only way, it seems, that the rearing of animals for
xenotransplantation can be justified is in terms of necessity and a
balancing of rights, in a pseudo-utilitarian way. If a person needs an
organ, then an amount of suffering is going to be caused to them if they
do not receive it. Their suffering will be greater than that which can
possibly be caused to an animal. In this way, the process can be
legitimised.
This is logically sound, but somewhat ethically unsatisfactory.
Although Kant felt that animals could be used as a means by people, it
did not follow that this power should be abused. If the realities of a large
scale xenotransplantation programme are as distressing as they seem,
62 Mark Hanson, Lilly-Marlene Russow and Charles McCarthy, 'Case Study: A
xenotransplantation protocol', in The Hastings Center Report, (1999) Vol. 29, 22-25,
24.
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perhaps the exact balance of suffering is irrelevant. Xenotransplantation
may have crossed Bentham's 'insuperable line' 6 4 , and in this respect it
may well be inappropriate to justify xenotransplantation by any utilitarian
argument. It is key, therefore, that the anencephalic infant is incapable of
any form of suffering, and it is primarily this factor which makes the
neonate the ethically better donor than any sentient animal.
E. SOME CONCLUSIONS
It has been concluded that the anencephalic newborn is a better donor
than the baboon, and it has further been concluded that an animal's
suffering requires justification and cannot be needlessly inflicted. It is a
stage of the conclusion that the neonate is not a person and has no ability
to suffer, even as a non-human. It seems a logical conclusion therefore
that the organs of the neonate could be used, were science to make this
possible, for xenotransplantation into the baboon. Indeed, an animal's
suffering is recognised, albeit not as greatly as that of a person, and any a
strict utilitarian argument might not only therefore authorise such a
procedure, but could even require it. It was left undecided whether the
organs of the neonate could be used for transplantation against the
consent of the parents, as this was considered to be too fine a hypothetical
balancing act to have any meaning. Let us assume for a moment that the
parents are happy for the organs to be used to save an animal. Consent
has no legal meaning here, since we are dealing with a non-person, but it
is relevant for the sake of the wider utilitarian arguments. This argument
permits the use of organs for this purpose, since it would increase the
utility of relatives. If the animal's utility is of any worth, this greater
increases net utility, but in a strict utilitarian sense the animal would not
be treated as part of society. But, repeating the argument against
artificially prolonging the life of the neonate to cultivate larger organs,
this was considered to be unnecessary since there is no shortage of
smaller organs required. This seems to be one of the greatest guards
against using these organs to save animals. Indeed, it would quite clearly
be preferable, even, to grow these larger organs for the purpose of saving
older people, since every argument advanced thus far has shown how the
person is to be prized above any animal. Furthermore, such operations
64 Bentham, (n 56) footnote 283.
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could be seen as interfering with the fine balance of nature and her natural
selection if conducted with wild animals. This argument would not apply
in the case of domestic animals.
In conclusion, the non-sentient baby should not be given the same
rights as any person. There is a vital differentiation to be found between
the human body and the person within it. It is possible for the former to
function after the death of the latter. With the case of the anencephalic
infant, birth does not take place. There is no person to protect. It is not
physical appearance that defines the person but instead the ability to
reason, or at least a potential to do so. In the case of the brain dead infant,
this capacity can never exist. The baboon, on the other hand, although
non-rational in the Kantian sense, has some cognitive ability. Most
importantly, even if not self-conscious, it can suffer. Where the baby can
physically react to pain, the baboon can respond to it. It is definitely not
justifiable to inflict such suffering where there is the option of saving a
human life without causing any suffering at all. Moreover, any
xenotransplantation programme would cause such a degree of suffering
that it cannot be justified at all, even where there exists no viable
alternative. An animal may not be capable of manners, but it is by no
means devoid of emotion.
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